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This paper focuses on the attempts by Daesh (also known as the Islamic State 
of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) to use Twitter to disseminate its online magazine, 
Rumiyah. It examines a dataset of 11,520 tweets mentioning Rumiyah that 
contained an outlink, to evaluate the success of Daesh’s attempts to use 
Twitter as a gateway to issues of its magazine. 
Key Findings 
• The primary tactic that Daesh employed was to post outlinks to a 
large number of different file-sharing sites. Most of these sites were 
smaller platforms, such as justpaste.it. There was no evidence of Daesh 
seeking to signpost Twitter users to copies of Rumiyah available from 
repositories maintained by researchers or NGOs.
• Twitter was effective in its response to Daesh’s attempts to use its 
platform as a gateway to Rumiyah. The majority of outlinks to a PDF of 
the magazine either no longer work or meet with a requirement for a 
subscription and/or password. Moreover, a high proportion of the user 
accounts that posted outlinks to PDFs of Rumiyah were suspended and 
the tweets that these accounts posted received relatively few retweets.
• Botnets were responsible for a significant number of the tweets. Almost 
one-third of the tweets were the product of the ‘Reffy Botnet’ (ref.gl). 
This is a URL shortener that is commonly used in networks of ill-intent. 
Accounts that use it are now suspended by Twitter.
• Roughly one-third of the tweets outlinked to news reports and coverage 
of Rumiyah. Some of this news coverage had the effect of amplifying the 
message contained in the magazine. This raises questions about the role 
of traditional news media in the dissemination of terrorist propaganda. 
Summary of Recommendations 
• Where possible, Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT) 
members should develop shared automated systems that use 
behavioural cues to block terrorist content.
• There is a pressing need to expand membership of the GIFCT.
• Dialogue is needed between the GIFCT and the news media regarding 
the use of social media to share news coverage that has the effect of 
amplifying the terrorist message. 
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Overview
In response to Daesh’s ‘Golden Age’ on Twitter,1 in late 2014 the platform 
began an aggressive campaign of suspensions. Since then, Daesh’s presence 
on Twitter has diminished significantly, with much of its community-building 
activities moving to other platforms, particularly Telegram.2  As Maura Conway 
and colleagues concluded in their 2017 report Disrupting Daesh: Measuring 
Takedown of Online Terrorist Material and its Impacts, today Daesh’s Twitter 
activity ‘has largely been reduced to tactical use of throwaway accounts for 
distributing links to pro-IS content on other platforms, rather than as a space 
for public IS support and influencing activity’.3 
This paper builds on the findings of Disrupting Daesh, as well as two other 
publications to which some of the present authors contributed.4 The latter 
work focused on the profiles of Daesh throwaway disseminator accounts. 
It found that these accounts were mostly recently established (often less 
than one day old at the time of suspension). They had very few followers 
(sometimes none) and received few retweets. Some sought to compensate 
for this lack of visibility by repeat posting. Here, the focus of this paper 
shifts to a different aspect of Daesh’s strategy with analysis of the outlinks 
contained in tweets mentioning Rumiyah – to learn more about the types 
of content these throwaway accounts outlink to, and the platforms on 
which this content is stored. The paper evaluates Twitter’s response to 
Daesh’s attempts to use the platform as a gateway to Rumiyah magazine and 
concludes by offering practical recommendations. 
1. Maura Conway et al., Disrupting Daesh: Measuring Takedown of Online Terrorist 
Material and its Impacts (VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2017), p. 28.
2. Nico Prucha, ‘IS and the Jihadist Information Highway – Projecting Influence 
and Religious Identity via Telegram’, Perspectives on Terrorism (Vol. 10, No. 6, 
2016), pp. 48–58; Stuart Macdonald, Sara Giro Correia and Amy-Louise Watkin, 
‘Regulating Terrorist Content on Social Media: Automation and the Rule of Law’, 
International Journal of Law in Context (Vol. 15, forthcoming).
3. Conway et al., Disrupting Daesh, p. 30.
4. Daniel Grinnell et al., ‘Who Disseminates Rumiyah? Examining the Relative 
Influence of Sympathiser and Non-Sympathiser Twitter Users’, paper 
presented at the 2nd European Counter Terrorism Centre Advisory Group 
conference, Europol Headquarters, The Hague, 17–18 April 2018, <https://
www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/who-disseminates-rumiyah-
examining-relative-influence-of-sympathiser-and-non-sympathiser-twitter-
users>, accessed 18 June 2019; Daniel Grinnell, Stuart Macdonald and David 
Mair, ‘The Response of, and on, Twitter to the Release of Dabiq Issue 15’, 
paper presented at the 1st European Counter Terrorism Centre conference on 
online terrorist propaganda, Europol Headquarters, The Hague, 10–11 April 
2017, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/response-of-
and-twitter-to-release-of-dabiq-issue-15>, accessed 18 June 2019.
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Methodology
Data was collected between 1 November 2016 and 31 October 2017 with 
Cardiff University’s Sentinel research tool.5 For the purposes of the study, a 
tweet was included in the dataset if it satisfied the following five criteria: 
(1) mentioned the term ‘Rumiyah’; (2) was posted within 21 days of the 
release of a new issue of Rumiyah; (3) was posted from an account that 
used the English-language interface (US or UK); (4) contained original 
content (in other words, was not a retweet); and (5) contained an outlink. 
In addition, the publicly available user data of these posts was collected, as 
were the details of each post (including when it was posted), the onward 
distribution counts of these posts, and the account status (at the end of the 
data-collection period).6 
The research dataset encompassed nine issues of Rumiyah.7 It contained a 
total of 11,520 posts. These posts contained a total of 892 distinct links and 
were posted by a total of 1,493 distinct user accounts. 
Outlinking to Where?
The outlinks in the 11,520 posts in the dataset contained a total of 244 different 
hostnames. Table 1 shows the 10 most common hostnames, respectively 
ordered by the number of posts, the number of distinct links containing the 
hostname and the number of distinct users that posted the outlink. 
5. Alun Preece et al., ‘Sentinel: A Codesigned Platform for Semantic Enrichment 
of Social Media Streams’, IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems 
(Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2018), pp. 118–31.
6. For the purposes of this study, Sentinel functioned only as a repository of 
structured data supplied by the Twitter streaming application programming 
interface.
7. These were issues 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. Issues 1 and 2 were 
published before the study began. Issues 6 and 8 were excluded from the 
study owing to the research data capture infrastructure not collecting all 
relevant tweets for the entirety of the data collection period following the 
release of these issues.
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Table 1: The URLs to Which the Outlinks Led: Top 10 Hostnames 
By number of posts By number of distinct links By number of distinct users posting the outlink
Hostname Total Hostname Total Hostname Extant Suspended Total
ref.gl 3,733 ref.gl 84 drive.google.com 3 561 564
drive.google.com 1,634 memri.org 69 cloud.mail.ru 1 351 352
cloud.mail.ru 878 archive.org 58 cldup.com 3 291 294
justpaste.it 535 drive.google.com 54 archive.org 6 215 221
cldup.com 475 justpaste.it 39 1drv.ms 0 180 180
archive.org 464 facebook.com 29 dropbox.com 0 133 133
yadi.sk 417 4shared.com 19 yadi.sk 1 124 125
1drv.ms 336 cldup.com 17 pc.cd 0 102 102
jpst.it 329 siteintelgroup.com 15 4shared.com 0 70 70
dropbox.com 188 cloud.mail.ru 14 cloudup.com 1 60 61
Source: Authors’ research. 
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Three important points emerged from Table 1. The first is the prevalence of 
file-sharing sites and smaller platforms. Sixteen different hostnames appear 
in Table 1, and of these, 11 are file-sharing sites. For both the first count (by 
number of posts) and the third count (by number of distinct users), nine of 
the top 10 hostnames are file-sharing sites. The exceptions are ref.gl and 
pc.cd. Second, a total of 2,102 distinct users posted the outlinks to the hostnames 
listed in the third count. Of these, 2,087 (99.3%) had been suspended by the end 
of the data-collection period. This high suspension rate strongly suggests that it 
was Daesh sympathisers who were posting outlinks to these file-sharing sites. 
Third, there is clear evidence of botnet activity. It is striking that ref.gl – which 
was top of each of the first two counts – does not feature in the third count at 
all. Known as the ‘Reffy Botnet’, ref.gl is a URL shortener that is commonly used 
in networks of ill-intent. In April 2018, all accounts using the ref.gl shortener 
were suspended by Twitter.8 In the dataset, ref.gl was used in a total of 84 
distinct links. These links appeared in a total of 3,733 posts (32.4% of the posts 
in the dataset). Just nine user accounts were responsible for these posts (and 
one of these accounts only posted a single tweet).9 The tweets containing the 
Reffy Botnet were posted following the release of issues 10, 11, 12 and 13 of 
Rumiyah at an average rate of more than 50 tweets per day. 
The hostname pc.cd also appeared to be connected to botnet activity. This 
hostname appeared in a total of 160 posts. These were all posted in the space 
of just over 25 hours,10 by a total of 102 distinct user accounts (whose user 
names were randomised collections of letters). All of these user accounts 
were subsequently suspended. 
Outlinking to What?
Table 2 breaks down the 892 distinct outlinks by the type of content each link 
led to. For those outlinks that no longer worked (for example, because the 
destination page had been removed or the hostname suspended), the type 
of content was determined by examining the text of both the URL and the 
post. Given the inherent limitations of relying on the wording of the URL and 
post, a distinction was drawn between categorisations in which there was 
a high degree of confidence and those in which there was only a moderate 
degree of confidence. As Table 2 shows, even after completing this process 
there remained a total of 29 outlinks that were so unclear that it was not 
possible to categorise them. 
8. Mike Farb, ‘The Reffy Botnet’, Medium, 29 April 2018, <https://medium.com/@
unhackthevote/the-reffy-botnet-f8a7dc817e9a>, accessed 18 June 2019.
9. The nine accounts were @MiddleBeast, @ExtremePropa, @ExtremistWatch_, 
@islamoinform, @JihadiInfo, @TabsTerror, @terror_history1,  
@terrorwatch1, and @VicPower87. The last of these was responsible for just 
one of the 3,733 tweets. All nine accounts have since been suspended.
10. From 20:06 on 9 September 2017 to 21:26 on 10 September 2017.
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Table 2: Types of Content Behind the Outlinks
Type of content Number of 
distinct links 
(high confidence)
Number of 
distinct links 
(moderate 
confidence)
Total
Report/summary/information about Rumiyah 232 90 322 (36.1%)
PDF of Rumiyah (but no longer available) 79 228 307 (34.4%)
PDF of Rumiyah behind subscription or password 
protection
56 3 59 (6.6%)
Other content (not terrorism-related) 39 11 50 (5.6%)
Other content (terrorism-related) 27 4 31 (3.5%)
Academic analysis/writing 14 16 30 (3.3%)
Not possible to tell - - 29 (3.3%)
Picture of real Rumiyah issue 16 5 21 (2.4%)
Picture of fake Rumiyah issue 13 5 18 (2.0%)
PDF of Rumiyah (currently available) 15 0 15 (1.7%)
Suspicious ‘download’ button 5 0 5 (0.6%)
Fake issue of Rumiyah 5 0 5 (0.6%)
Total 501 362 892
Source: Authors’ research. 
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For a total of 322 outlinks, the type of content was report/summary/
information about Rumiyah. This category consisted largely of news items 
either specifically about a new issue of the magazine or in which Rumiyah 
featured prominently. In the entire dataset, there were just three posts that 
were retweeted more than 50 times during the data-collection period.11 All 
three outlinked to the same news item in the UK’s Daily Mail newspaper, 
titled ‘ISIS Calls on Islamists to Carry out Knife Attacks in Areas Such as Alleys, 
Forests and Quiet Neighbourhoods and Told to Aim for “a Reasonable Kill 
Count” in Latest Magazine’.12 The Daily Mail was one of two UK newspapers 
that, in the aftermath of the recent Christchurch, New Zealand attack, posted 
the video of the attack on its website. This has raised concerns about the 
traditional news media, especially as it has been reported that the attack 
video only went viral after this happened.13 The dataset for this report raises 
similar questions. For example, one outlink led to an item published by 
the UK’s Metro newspaper in September 2016. It describes how Issue 1 of 
Rumiyah states that killing disbelievers is a form of worship to Allah, ‘even the 
blood of the kafir street vendor selling flowers to those passing by’.14 Below 
this is a photo of a market trader at a flower stall, which Rumiyah’s producers 
had apparently taken from the trader’s website. Rumiyah offers no indication 
of the trader’s name or the location of his flower stall. By contrast, the item 
in Metro names the trader and states the area in which his stall is located. A 
simple Google search reveals that several other UK newspapers ran a similar 
story, including a local newspaper that named the street in which the flower 
stall can be found. The effect of this news coverage was thus to amplify – 
and, importantly, to sharpen – the message contained in Rumiyah. 
Table 2 also shows that a total of 381 of the outlinks led to a PDF of Rumiyah. 
Of these, 307 (80.6%) were no longer available, 59 (15.5%) were behind 
a subscription requirement or password protection, and just 15 (3.9%) 
led directly to the PDF. The 381 outlinks contained a total of 48 different 
hostnames, which are listed in Table 3. Table 3 also shows the number of 
11. There were only 22 posts that were retweeted 10 times or more. Four of 
these outlinked to password-protected copies of Rumiyah, one outlinked to 
a PDF of Rumiyah that is no longer available. The others outlinked to news 
items (eight posts), academic analyses (six posts) and other terrorism-related 
content (three posts).
12. Hannah Al-Othman, ‘ISIS Calls on Islamists to Carry Out Knife Attacks in Areas 
Such as Alleys, Forests and Quiet Neighbourhoods and Told to Aim for “a 
Reasonable Kill Count” in Latest Magazine’, Daily Mail, 5 October 2016. The 
three tweets received 220, 54 and 52 retweets respectively.
13. Tech Against Terrorism, ‘Analysis: New Zealand Attack and the Terrorist Use of 
the Internet’, undated, <https://www.techagainstterrorism.org/2019/03/26/
analysis-new-zealand-attack-and-the-terrorist-use-of-the-internet/>, accessed 
18 June 2019.
14. Ashitha Nagesh, ‘Isis Magazine Urges Followers to Kill a Random Florist in 
Cheshire’, Metro, 7 September 2016.
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distinct outlinks containing each hostname, as well as the total number 
of posts containing these outlinks and the number of reposts these posts 
received. Hostnames for which there were just one or two distinct links 
appear in a single category, ‘Other hostnames’. 
Two points in particular emerge from Table 3. The first is that 5,714 (83.9%) 
of the posts outlinked to just seven of the hostnames: drive.google.com; 
archive.org; ref.gl; cldup.com; cloud.mail.ru; 1drv.ms; and yadi.sk. Excluding 
ref.gl – discussed previously – Table 1 showed that a total of 1,736 distinct 
users posted links to these six hostnames. Of these, 1,722 (99.2%) had 
been suspended by the end of the data-collection period for this report. 
The second point is the ratio of posts to reposts. Between them, the 6,808 
posts containing an outlink to Rumiyah received a total of just 800 reposts 
during the data-collection period (8.51 tweets per retweet). Together, the 
high suspension rate and low number of reposts indicate that Twitter was 
successful in frustrating efforts to use its platform to disseminate new 
issues of Rumiyah. 
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Table 3: Outlinks to a PDF of Rumiyah, by Hostname and Number of Posts 
Hostname Number of distinct 
links to a PDF
Number of posts 
containing a link to 
the PDF
Number of reposts 
containing a link to 
the PDF
Total number of 
posts and reposts
drive.google.com 53 1,631 85 1,716
archive.org 53 442 171 613
ref.gl 32 1,450 81 1,531
justpaste.it 29 82 138 220
cldup.com 26 562 70 632
4shared.com 18 103 15 118
cloud.mail.ru 13 877 37 914
siteintelgroup.com 13 27 70 97
mediafire.com 13 44 11 55
1drv.ms 12 335 10 345
dropbox.com 12 188 13 201
pietervanostaeyen.com 12 17 25 42
memri.org 12 15 2 17
yadi.sk 11 417 4 421
almlf.com 10 15 7 22
counterjihadreport.com 8 46 31 77
up.top4top.net 5 27 10 37
trackingterrorism.org 5 5 6 11
facebook.com 3 3 0 3
Other hostnames 41 522 14 536
Total 381 6,808 800 7,608
Source: Authors’ research. 
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Outlinks to Openly Available PDFs of Rumiyah
Table 4 details the 15 outlinks to openly available PDFs of Rumiyah.15 
Table 4: Outlinks to Currently Available PDFs of Rumiyah
Hostname Number of posts 
containing the 
link
Number of times 
the posts have 
been reposted
Number of users 
that posted the 
links
Status of user 
accounts
cloud.mail.ru 154 0 154 All suspended
qb5cc3pam3y2ad0tm1zxuhho-
wpengine.netdna-ssl.com
14 3 6 Five extant, one 
suspended
adobe.ly 4 0 2 Both extant
drive.google.com 2 1 2 One extent, one 
suspended
azelin.files.wordpress.com 2 1 1 Extant
azelin.files.wordpress.com 2 0 1 Extant
jihadology.net 1 0 1 Extant
cloud.mail.ru 1 0 1 Suspended
cloudup.com 1 0 1 Suspended
pietervanostaeyen.com 1 0 1 Extant
clarionproject.org 1 2 1 Extant
magentacloud.de 1 0 1 Suspended
magentacloud.de 1 0 1 Suspended
reddit.com 1 0 1 Suspended
reddit.com 1 0 1 Suspended
Total 187 7 175
Source: Authors’ research. 
15. The researchers shared the 15 URLs with the relevant authorities. Some have subsequently been removed.
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Three points emerge from Table 4. First, there is again evidence of botnet 
activity. While the 15 outlinks appeared in a total of 187 posts, 154 of 
these posts contained the same URL. These 154 tweets were all posted by 
different users. The names of all these users were randomised collections of 
numbers and letters, and all accounts had been suspended by the end of the 
data-collection period – although curiously the outlink remained functional. 
The other 14 outlinks appeared in a combined total of 33 posts. These 
tweets were posted by a total of 19 distinct users.16 They received just 
seven retweets. 
Second, the fact that 12 of the user accounts remain extant is not necessarily 
indicative of a failure on Twitter’s part to enforce its terms of service, 
which prohibit promoting and recruiting for a violent extremist group. In 
accordance with this, the accounts of non-Daesh sympathisers who posted 
outlinks to the group’s magazine (for example, for research purposes or 
general interest) were not suspended. 
Third, it is noteworthy that four of the URLs in Table 4 outlink to repositories 
maintained by researchers (and a fifth outlinked to a repository maintained 
by an NGO, the Clarion Project). Three of these URLs outlinked to the 
website jihadology.net.17 This site has received much scrutiny in recent 
months, with reports that the UK government urged WordPress.com to 
place the site’s contents behind password protection or close it altogether.18 
However, in terms of the specific study for this report, it seems clear that 
Daesh sympathisers did not seek to use Twitter to signpost users to copies 
of Rumiyah on jihadology.net. Not only were there only five posts containing 
outlinks to jihadology.net in the entire dataset of 11,520 tweets – with these 
five posts receiving a total of just one retweet during the data-collection 
period – but none of these five tweets was posted by a Daesh sympathiser.19 
The fourth URL outlinked to the site pietervanostaeyen.com. This site is also 
hosted by WordPress.com, but is password protected. Users are required 
16. The figures in the relevant column in Table 4 add up to 21. The reason for this 
apparent disparity is that there were two users that shared more than one 
of the outlinks. The same user shared both of the outlinks to reddit.com, and 
another user shared two distinct links to jihadology.net. 
17. The two links using the hostname azelin.files.wordpress.com, plus the one 
using jihadology.net.
18. David Bond, ‘How Extremist Videos are Hitting UK Relations with US Tech 
Groups’, Financial Times, 3 December 2018. It should be noted that the 
GIFCT has funded Tech Against Terrorism to develop a new interface for 
jihadology.net, to ensure that particularly sensitive content is only accessible 
to users with registered academic/research, governmental, journalistic or 
humanitarian email addresses.
19. The three users that posted these five tweets were two academic researchers 
and an individual tweeting in a personal capacity.
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to register for an account. In spite of this, the outlink collected led directly 
to a PDF of an issue of Rumiyah without requiring a password.20 Moreover, 
the owner has in any event publicly stated that he approves every request 
he receives for access to the website, explaining that he lacks the capacity 
to vet those who request access.21 This raises doubts about whether the 
introduction of password protection on jihadology.net would in fact limit the 
availability of the materials it contains, in the absence of sufficient resources 
to vet access requests properly. 
Conclusion and Recommendations
The aim of this study was to examine in more detail Daesh’s attempts to use 
throwaway accounts to signpost users to copies of its magazine, Rumiyah, 
on other platforms, to evaluate the extent to which Twitter operates as a 
gateway to the magazine. Ample evidence was found of Daesh employing this 
tactic. There were outlinks to a large number of different file-sharing sites, 
most of which were smaller platforms, although, interestingly, there was no 
evidence of Daesh seeking to signpost Twitter users to copies of Rumiyah 
that are freely available from repositories maintained by researchers or 
NGOs. Twitter’s response to Daesh’s attempts to use the platform as a 
gateway to Rumiyah appeared effective. The vast majority of outlinks to a 
PDF of the magazine either no longer work or are met with a requirement 
for a subscription and/or password. Moreover, a high proportion of the user 
accounts that posted outlinks to PDFs of Rumiyah were suspended and the 
tweets that these accounts posted received relatively few retweets. 
In the light of these findings, the following recommendations are offered: 
• Larger social media companies have automated means that 
employ behavioural cues to block content (for example, abnormal 
posting volume or using trending hashtags to gain attention). This 
is valuable in the present context, given the finding that botnet 
activity played a significant role in efforts to disseminate Rumiyah. By 
contrast, many smaller companies rely exclusively on humans to use 
content-based cues to identify and remove terrorist content. Where 
possible, GIFCT members should develop shared automated systems 
that use behavioural cues to block terrorist content.
• There is a pressing need to expand membership of the GIFCT. At present 
the GIFCT has 14 members, a small number in comparison to the 244 
different hostnames contained in the research dataset. Many smaller 
technology companies lack the capacity needed to meet the standards 
20. This was tested for every other issue of Rumiyah stored on the website and 
this problem only existed for this one issue.
21. Bob Garfield, ‘Archiving Terrorist Propaganda’, WNYC Studios,  
22 March 2019, <https://www.wnycstudios.org/story/archiving-terrorist-
propaganda-jihadology>, accessed 18 June 2019.
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imposed by the GIFCT eligibility criteria. Some lack the willingness to 
abide by these criteria. Here policymakers have an important role to play, 
providing the support required by the former and offering appropriate 
incentives to the latter.
• The role of the traditional news media in the dissemination of terrorist 
propaganda must be addressed. At present the public debate in Western 
countries focuses on the responsibilities of large technology platforms. 
But discussions about the responsibilities of platforms should be 
broadened to include traditional news media, to examine issues such 
as the sharing of news coverage that has the effect of amplifying 
the terrorist message. As Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu, Head of 
Counter Terrorism Policing, stated in an open letter following the attacks 
in Christchurch, New Zealand, ‘it’s time to have a sensible conversation 
about how to report terrorism in a way that doesn’t help terrorists’.22 
Stuart Macdonald is Professor of Law in the School of Law at Swansea University
Daniel Grinnell is Research Associate in the School of Social Sciences at 
Cardiff University
Anina Kinzel is a Doctoral Candidate in Applied Linguistics at Swansea University
Nuria Lorenzo-Dus is Professor of Linguistics in the Department of Applied 
Linguistics at Swansea University 
22. National Police Chief’s Council, ‘Head of Counter Terrorism Policing Issues 
Open Letter About Reporting of Terrorism’, 20 March 2019, <https://news.
npcc.police.uk/releases/head-of-counter-terrorism-policing-issues-open-
letter-about-reporting-of-terrorism>, accessed 13 June 2019.
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